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Principles and compromise in reform-related negotiation processes2 
 
 
Abstract 
Workshop on Ethics in Decision Making, TU-Delft (Human-Centered 
Processes), June 9th 2008. Delft, The Netherlands.  
 
Acceptance or rejection of reforms in political or administrative contexts can 
be viewed as the result of a negotiation process, which is either explicit or 
tacit. Here we focus on a dimension of such processes which has hitherto 
been neglected to some extent: the role and perception of guiding principles. 
Such principles raise issues concerning the nature of rule-following, when 
the rules are fairly general and call for interpretation (and this is generally 
the case when the rules have ethical significance). This is not alien to some 
currents of research about bargaining and computer support for bargaining.  
The specificities of rule-following in such contexts can help explain some 
features of reform-related negotiation or compromise-building processes. 
This is illustrated by the insights from two case studies: (1) reform of the 
hospital system in France in the 1970s and (2) present-day innovation policy 
in Norway.  
 
1. Introduction 
Principles play a role in negotiation. At the very least, they help structure the 
issues around which the threat of continuing conflict and the prospects for 
cooperation revolve. In political or administrative settings, agents are especially 
interested in the application and interpretation of underlying principles, which are 
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(France). Both authors : DELICOM project (research team « Philosophies contemporaines », 
NoSoPhi group), C19-06, Université Paris-1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, 90 rue de Tolbiac F-75013 Paris.  
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often associated with important ethical, professional or political values (Backhaus 
2001, Moor 2005).  
This results in challenges for the proper understanding of negotiation processes 
and for proper counselling to agents who take part in such processes. In particular, 
the scheduling and the very conception of reforms should reflect the foreseeable 
difficulties in the implementation of reform, and the insights from theory and 
experience about the negotiation mechanisms which result in better prospects for 
all agents. This seems to be recommended, at least, if political and administrative 
decision-making is to bring about changes in the predicted directions.  
Our intention is to pave the way for a better understanding of such processes, 
understood as institutional bargaining processes. Our conclusions partially rely on 
two case studies (about (a) reform of the hospital system in France in the 1970s 
and (b) innovation policy in Norway nowadays) which will be summed up; they 
also stem from an attempt at a better integration of principles into the framework 
of institutional analysis.  
2. Taking principles to the forefront of negotiation analysis  
In a world of institutions and institutional actors, dialogue is essential to the 
negotiation processes which bring about changes in rules, policies and public 
values. Usually, dialogue doesn’t start off from scratches. It moves ahead under 
the shadow of principles - most conspicuously, those principles which delineate 
the respective areas of competence for the institutional actors, and those principles 
which express institutional functions, goals or basic deontological benchmarks.  
Hence there is a good case for devoting some effort to elucidate the functionings 
of principles (and their institutional implementation) in reform-related negotiation 
processes. Ultimately, the modelling and computer simulation of dialogue-cum-
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negotiation processes could help avoid scenarios which lead to unsatisfactory 
endpoints, widely resented by participants as conundrum situations. In those 
scenarios, agents might well be aware of conceivable situations in which 
everybody would be better-off. Moreover, the level of mutual distrust sometimes 
raises up to politically dangerous levels.  
There is no denying that cultural factors may have a role in the explanation of 
successful or unsuccessful dialogue, negotiation and reform. But recent research 
results about political negotiation processes suggest that there exist structural 
features of the implication of principles or semi-interpreted rules and goals (which 
call for further interpretation in implementation phases – see Jones and Clark 
2001, Matland 1995, Reynaud 2003). The very presence of dialogue testifies to 
the fact that the negotiation problem, and perhaps the rules of negotiation itself, 
are partly indeterminate. But this does not amount to identifying a mere defect of 
the process; more plausibly, this is a feature that opens some avenues for 
compromise-building, even though it might complicate the viability of some other 
avenues. Thus, taking principles seriously is a necessary step for the 
benchmarking of reform-related negotiation processes3.  
By “reform-related negotiation processes” we refer to processes which are 
initiated by political or administrative authorities with a view to bringing about, in 
a voluntarist manner, definite changes in rules or institutional structure in a given 
sector4. Although their practical importance cannot be denied, such processes are 
ill-understood. They include a negotiation component, because they exhibit the 
                                                
3 Insofar as the external or interactive role of institutional agents appears to be an integral 
component of their functionings, such betterment may be considered part of the broadly conceived 
tasks of institutional design. 
4 Roughly speaking, this falls within the ambit of policy implementation, but our own ongoing 
research project strongly suggests that the analysis should have much in common with the analysis 
of interactive episodes in which the distribution of power is of a less hierarchical nature.  
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following features to varying degrees: (1) they might fail and this poses a threat to 
the agents, (2) the goals of the institutional actors are not necessarily convergent, 
and (3) the parties to the negotiation have a capacity to strike compromise. In the 
cases at hand, compromises usually assume the form of a set of (modified) rules 
or institutional characteristics.  
A second analytic starting point is the working definition of an “institution”. It 
will be defined as a social equilibrium among agents, which consists of a typical 
pattern of simultaneous actions (or a set of such patterns), and beliefs which allow 
individual actions to fit to one another (this includes, in particular, the beliefs or 
expectations of agents about the attitudes or conduct of other agents).  
The realised association and mutual interdependence of such actions and beliefs 
makes for an effective or “enforcing” equilibrium, which is sometimes amenable 
to being described with the tools of game theory5. For explanatory, descriptive or 
analytic purposes, a relevant enforcing equilibrium of this sort should be 
described in such a manner that it can be identified with the typical functionings 
of existing, concrete “institutions”, and every such institution comprises at least a 
certain distribution of roles or action domains6, and norms which summarize the 
goals or functions of institutional action, as well as the side constraints it 
shouldn’t violate7.  
                                                
5 The association and mutual interdependence does not amount to a perfect fit between action and 
beliefs on the part of every actor. Indeed, it has been conjectured with some credibility that 
institutional forms owe their distinctness and resilience to the (sometimes rational) ability of 
agents not to adapt in a perfectly reactive way to just every new piece of information (Heiner 
1983).  
6 In real-world institutions, this distribution is usually quite formal and it might gradually move 
apart from shifted positions of real power, in the sense of the ability to achieve one’s preferred 
results in the world. On this differentiation, see Aghion and Tirole 1997, Picavet and 
Razafimahatolotra 2008.  
7 The norms are often formulated through general and imprecise principles (“public transportation 
should be committed to the continuity of the service to the public”, “universities should promote 
equal access to learning and professional education”, and the like). 
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A third analytic starting point is the choice of an approach to compromise in 
which the latter does not reduce to an endpoint. When rules (or the interpretations 
of principles, or institutional patterns) are at stake, compromise does not assume 
the form of an endpoint, because the social use of rules (or principles, or 
institutional patterns) is flexible in nature, and keeps adapting to new situations in 
complex, partly unpredictable ways8. For this reason it is more appropriate to 
think of compromises as temporary institutional patterns which occur in a 
particular slice of time along the path of institutional evolution. The relevant slice 
of time is the “reform” episode, which harbours successive moves by institutional 
actors.   
Then the ability to enforce a compromise in a smooth way can be dealt with, 
analytically, in terms of the viability of a certain institutional arrangement, of 
which the projected reform consists. Political or administrative reforms are not 
just endpoints which can be contrasted with the status quo situation. In broad 
terms, they usually consist of a certain institutional setting which should harbour 
successive social situations, which are taken from a certain predicted spectrum (or 
subset of conceivable situations)9. 
Sometimes, things happen to be as they were predicted, in the rough, and 
sometimes not. In the latter case, we might describe the situation as an example of 
how the reformed institutional framework turns out to be unstable. Given our 
working definition of institutions, the path-setting reformed scheme is an 
institution, but its functionings might turn down the whole scheme none the less. 
                                                
8 For background discussions, see Bailyn 2002 and Reynaud 2003. Another illustration is to be 
found in Picavet 2006a, 2006b.  
9 Such situations are identified with the “normal” or predicted functionings of the reformed 
institutional setting (or “reform”), and this usually implies a series of continuing moves and 
concessions on the part of institutional actors. When the goals of the different actors are not fully 
congruent, the viability of reform can only involve concessions.  
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Given these analytic choices, of particular interest is the study of how institutional 
arrangements may have a capacity to reinforce themselves through time, by which 
we mean (after current practice in institutionalist social science) a capacity to 
sustain the processes (dialogue, compromise and action) which yield the “normal” 
or “predicted” institutional functionings.   
3. Key insights from case studies  
The case studies we jointly realised (Picavet and Guibet Lafaye 2007, 2008) focus 
on the relationships between the political actors’s strategies and the interpretative 
tasks with respect to underlying principles which are jointly referred to by all 
agents in argumentative exchanges.  
The first example is the reception of the 1970 hospital law in France. The 
interpretation of general principles was at stake and the parallel argument in both 
camps (right-wing officials and communist or other left-wing protesters) 
demonstrates agreement on the value of such principles as efficiency, technical 
progress and equal access to health care facilities. The struggle against 
inefficiencies should have been an object of agreement. But there was no 
agreement on the operational significance to be given to such principles. An 
additional problem was that the endorsement of possible compromise positions 
was widely perceived as dangerous. The general terms used in the formulation of 
policies and compromises were perceived as dangerous for future deliberation 
process because they gave rise to fears about the possible use of general words 
and principles. 
The ambiguity of principles, as well as the expected reallocations of power 
principles could harbour, appeared to have an important rule in the failure of 
agents to strike an evolving compromise. Some deadlocks of the social discussion 
 - 7 - 
were due to fears with respect to the foreseeable allocation of powers (given the 
use of new management methods), and this was rooted in the ambiguities of 
reform and its principles.  
When interpretation has its strategic side, agreement on common and essential 
principles doesn’t suffice to warrant an agreement on collective purposes. General 
principles both offer resources for political agreement and harbour future 
reallocations of competences and power positions which might weaken the 
negotiation position of some actors (such as trade-union leaders and local 
authorities) in a way that is perceived ex ante, with the result that concessions are 
blocked10.  
In our second example, present-day innovation policy in Norway, a very general 
principle – the principle of sustainability – is used as a benchmark for public 
policies and other principles such as equity and equality are paid due tribute11. 
The principles explicitly followed by political powers provide institutional actors 
(such as universities, firms, research institutes…) with reasons to trust the 
Norwegian government because the very process of implementation gives room to 
changes in the future interpretation of principles and to concomitant changes in 
the allocation of competences12. In this example, the implementation of 
sustainability-oriented reform provides institutional actors with an active role in 
bringing about or preventing qualitative changes.  
From the start, principles are used in a way which involves commitments (to 
action) and adaptation (to circumstances) so that collective action in reform 
                                                
10 A basic mechanism is that agents perceive that their future ability to influence the selected 
interpretation of principles or the way to articulate principles might be hurt. 
11 See esp. Commitment to Research. Report No.20 (2004-05) to Storting, Norwegian Ministry of 
Education and Research. 
12 This recognized interpretative flexibility is further supported by procedural rules for 
implementation which give much weight to continuing exchanges of views, bottom-up decision-
making and the backing of local or partial experiments. Thus all key institutional agents can expect 
to exert some influence on the way innovation policy is carried through. 
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implementation is possible and goes beyond verbal agreement. In such a case, the 
ambiguity of general principles gives resources for learning and for flexible 
adaptation to the shifting modalities of international cooperation and to the trends 
of scientific (or technical) progress13. These positive effects counterbalance the 
possible distrust associated to fears with respect to the evolving interpretation of 
general principles and such distrust is attenuated, or disappears, through 
procedural reassurances given to institutional actors to the effect that their 
preferences, initiatives and interpretations are seriously taken into account in the 
reform process.  
The acceptability of evolutions and reforms, here, is also due to the mutual 
reinforcement of past and new axiological references – for example, a new public-
sector ethic on the one hand and the values of equality and sustainable progress on 
the other hand. This gives an additional to believe that something is to be gained 
from the reliance on general principles when it comes to adapting to 
circumstances. Generally speaking, fears and distrust are likely to recede when 
explicit reasons that can be widely understood and supported by institutional 
agents are put forward in reform policy.  
It is a natural step to hypothesize that the factors at work undergo changes in the 
endogenous process through which institutions head either for adaptation or misfit 
with respect to external, exogenous conditions. This motivates the integrative 
steps we next describe.  
 
4. Theoretical integrative steps  
                                                
13 This is evidenced in Norway’s New White Paper on Research.  
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Recent explanations of institutional stability through time have drawn attention to 
the relevance of endogenous processes if we are to account for key features of 
known processes. More particularly, we shall use the theory in Greif and Laitin 
2004 as a benchmark model.  
This theory stresses the role played, in institutional evolution, by the “reinforcing” 
properties of institutional arrangements, that is, their capacity to promote the 
conditions which while enable them to offer more resistance to changing 
circumstances (exogenous, shifting parameters). Technically, this is captured 
through “quasi-parameters” which are affected by the social functionings of 
institutions in an endogenous manner and which, in turn, impact the ability of 
institutions not to be destabilized by changing circumstances (so that, for 
example, they will be enforceable for a larger set of possible parameter values). 
Taking an approach of this sort as a benchmark, we contend that the following 
factors should gain some importance in the explanation of institutional stability or 
instability: the shifts in shared or prevailing interpretations of the underlying 
principles; each agent’s capacity to rely on principles in order to have some 
success in the interactive process; and each agent’s margin for action in 
interpretation-setting tasks.  
Given our initial analytic choices, these factors should identically gain some 
importance in the understanding of how compromise-building is made sustainable 
or not in reform-based negotiation processes. In the terms of the Greif-Laitin 
benchmark model, such factors play the role of quasi-parameters. They are 
impacted by institutional functionings, and they impact the latter in turn in a way 
that conditions institutional reinforcing or self-undermining.  
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Analytically, this motivates an enlargement of the initial description of the main 
components of a concrete institution. In order to take into account the enumerated 
factors, it seems appropriate to let institutions comprise:  
I-1 A certain distribution of roles or action domains, which covers: 
- I-1-a an allocation of real decision capacities among institutional 
agents;  
- I-1-b the arrangements for the explanation or justification of actions 
with a view to the underlying, structuring principles;  
 - I-1-c procedural features, to do with (1) the way institutional agents can 
let some interpretations of principles prevail over other possible ones, and 
(2) the way they can implement these chosen interpretations. Such 
procedural features encapsulate the way in which different viewpoints are 
taken into account and weighed against one another in the typical 
institutional functionings.  
I-2 Norms (or principles) which summarize the goals or functions of institutional 
action, as well as the side constraints it should not infringe upon, and which allow 
for alternative credible interpretations.  
 
With this conceptual apparatus in mind, let us turn again to our examples. In the 
hospital example, the social equilibrium which tends to prevail is based on limited 
cooperation (around professional, general-interest tasks) with a substantial amount 
of conflict, such that the implementation of reform cannot be said to be smooth or 
satisfactory. In this example, compromise-building has very limited effectiveness 
and this seems to be related (or aggravated) by factors such as:  
(1) fears among the workers (or workers’s unions, or the Communist party) that 
some a priori consensual principles (such as modernisation, efficiency and the 
like) undergo adverse interpretative shifts; these expected shifts, especially in 
association with the following factor, favour distrust;  
(2) the fact that the “reformed” institution harbours shifted power positions, in the 
sense of an alteration of decision capacities; in the expectations of the workers’s 
unions, this makes room for a reinforcement of adverse interpretations;  
(3) the fact that the “reformed” institution, through shifted influence positions and 
new procedural rules, gives less weight to some viewpoint; this affects the way in 
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which differing viewpoints are taken into account in the decision-making 
processes, including the interpretation-setting and rule-following tasks. 
 These factors engender the continuing compromise-building processes which 
would be necessary for the reformed institutions to keep afloat. In this analysis, 
our attention is drawn to interpretations, expected positions of influence and the 
respective abilities to rely on the consensual principles in order to gain something 
(or avoid certain concessions) in the reform-based negotiation process. These 
factors can be viewed as quasi-parameters which, in this precise example, have an 
undermining (rather than reinforcing) effect on the reformed institutional 
framework. In theoretical terms, these factors are the result of the initial steps in 
the process (so that they can be viewed as the consequence of social equilibrium  
along the path of reform) but they have a capacity to undermine the predicted path 
of reform. The undermining assumes the form of a heightened sensitivity of the 
hospital system to exogenous shocks concerning the needs in the population and 
shifting costs for treatments. Changes in such external circumstances might result 
in crises, as they give advantages to one of the actors in conflict-ridden 
interaction.  
 In the Norwegian example, on the contrary, the equilibrium path of reform seems 
to be associated with quasi-parameters which have a reinforcing role. In 
particular, the selection of socially prevailing interpretations of principles, as well 
as the inclusive mechanisms through which the differing viewpoints are taken into 
account, provide institutional actors with important guarantees14. Moreover, the 
path of reform gives a central role to flexibility and the negotiated adjustment to 
shifting circumstances. Thus compromise-building procedures can be integrated 
                                                
14 These guarantees extend to their role in interpretation-setting tasks (due to widespread 
consultation and participation) and to their ability to refer to principles in an effective way to avoid 
some concessions. 
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into the agents’s strategies in a significant way. These mechanisms are well suited 
for continuing compromise-building, and the stability of reformed institutional 
arrangements, in the face of exogenous (and largely unpredictable) scientific and 
technological innovation, and exogenous changes in the modalities of 
international cooperation.  
5. Conclusion 
The observations from the case studies suggest that interpretative evolutions are 
very important indeed for a proper understanding of the reinforcement or the 
undermining of given institutional arrangements (with emphasis on their key 
features such as, for example, the allocation of institutional competences)15. 
Moreover, the growth and corruption of reform schemes appears to have deep 
connections with the ability of agents to rely on the principles in order to justify 
their initiatives, or in order to have some success about a disputed issue. Their 
capacity to put forward desired interpretative shifts, with some chance of being 
successful therein in some cases at least, also turns out to be a decisive feature of 
the position of actors.  
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